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Is Internet Exceptionalism Dead? 
By Tim Wu* 
In 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville released Democracy in America, the founding text 
of “American exceptionalism.”  After long study in the field, America, he had 
concluded, was just different than other nations.  In an often-quoted passage, de 
Tocqueville wrote: 
The position of the Americans is therefore quite exceptional, 
and it may be believed that no democratic people will ever be 
placed in a similar one.  Their strictly Puritanical origin—their 
exclusively commercial habits—even the country they inhabit, 
which seems to divert their minds from the pursuit of science, 
literature, and the arts—the proximity of Europe, which allows 
them to neglect these pursuits without relapsing into 
barbarism—a thousand special causes, of which I have only 
been able to point out the most important—have singularly 
concurred to fix the mind of the American upon purely 
practical objects.  His passions, his wants, his education, and 
everything about him seem to unite in drawing the native of 
the United States earthward; his religion alone bids him turn, 
from time to time, a transient and distracted glance to heaven.1   
Is there such a thing as Internet exceptionalism? If so, just what is the Internet 
an exception to? It may appear technical, but this is actually one of the big 
questions of our generation, for the Internet has shaped the United States and 
the world over the last twenty years in ways people still struggle to understand.  
From its beginnings the Internet has always been different from the networks 
that preceded it—the telephone, radio and television, and cable.  But is it 
different in a lasting way? 
The question is not merely academic.  The greatest Internet firms can be 
succinctly defined as those that have best understood what makes the Internet 
different.  Those that have failed to understand the “Network of Networks”—
say, AOL, perished, while those that have, like Google and Amazon, have 
flourished.  Hence the question of Internet exceptionalism is often a multi-
billion dollar question.  The state of the Internet has an obvious effect on 
national and international culture.  It is also of considerable political relevance, 
                                                     
* Professor, Columbia Law School; Fellow, New America Foundation 
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 519 (Henry Reeve trans., D. Appleton 
and Company 1904) (1831).  
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both for enforcement of the laws, and the rise of candidates and social 
movements. 
What makes the question so interesting is that the Internet is both obviously 
exceptional and unexceptional at the same time.  It depends on what you might 
think it is an exception to.  It is clear that the Internet was a dramatic revolution 
and an exception to the ordinary ways of designing communications systems.  
But whether it enjoys a special immunity to the longer and deeper forces that 
shape human history is, shall we say, yet to be seen.   
* * * 
In the early 2000s, Jack Goldsmith and I wrote Who Controls the Internet?2  The 
book is an explicitly anti-exceptionalist work.  It addressed one particular way 
that the Internet might be an exception, namely, the susceptibility, as it were, of 
the Internet to regulation by the laws of nations.  From the mid-1990s onward it 
was widely thought that the Internet would prove impossible to control or 
regulate.  Some legal scholars, in interesting and provocative work, argued that 
in some ways the Network might be considered to have its own sovereignty, 
like a nation-state.3  That was the boldest claim, but the general idea that the 
Internet was difficult or impossible to regulate was, at the time, a political, 
journalistic and academic commonplace, taken for granted.  For example, 
reflecting his times, in 1998 President Clinton gave a speech about China’s 
efforts to control the Internet.  “Now, there’s no question China has been 
trying to crack down on the Internet—good luck” he said.  “That’s sort of like 
trying to nail Jello to the wall.”4 
That was the conventional wisdom.  In our book we suggested that despite the 
wonders of the Network it did not present an existential challenge to national 
legal systems, reliant, as they are, on threats of physical force.5  We predicted 
that nations would, and to some degree already had, reassert their power over 
the Network, at least, for matters they cared about.  They would assert their 
power not over the Network in an abstract sense, but the actual, physical 
humans and machinery who lie underneath it.  Many of the book’s chapters 
ended with people in jail; unsurprisingly, China provided the strongest example 
of what a State will do to try to control information within its borders.   
                                                     
2 TIM WU & JACK GOLDSMITH, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET (2006). 
3 David Post & David Johnson, Law and Borders–The Rise of  Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1367 (1996). 
4 R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & THAD E. HALL, POINT, CLICK AND VOTE: THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNET VOTING 3 (2004). 
5 JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rumble, ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832). 
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Drama aside, in a deeper way, we were interested in what you might call the 
persistence of physicality.  Despite its virtual qualities, behind the concept of a 
global network were living human beings, blood and flesh.  The human body’s 
susceptibility to pain and imprisonment is a large part of what the nation-state 
bases its rule on, and that had not changed.  We predicted that the nation’s 
threat of physical force, otherwise known as laws, would therefore shape the 
Network as much as its founding ambitions. 
Here is how we put the point in the introduction to our book, written in about 
2005 or so: 
Our age is obsessed with the search for the newest “new 
thing.”  Our story, by contrast, is about old things—ancient 
principles of law and politics within nations, cooperation and 
clashes between nations, and the enduring relevance of 
territory, and physical coercion.  It is a story where Thomas 
Hobbes is as important as Bill Gates.  Like it or not, these old 
things are as important to the Net’s development, if not more 
so, than any technological or intellectual breakthrough.   
In these pages we present a strong resistance to Internet 
exceptionalism, or any arguments that new technologies can 
only be understood using novel intellectual frameworks.  Like 
other revolutionary communication technologies, the Internet 
has changed the way we live, and fostering undreamt of new 
forms of social organization and interaction.  But also like 
other revolutionary communication technologies, the Internet 
has not changed the fundamental roles played by territorial 
government.   
We are optimists who love the internet and believe that it can 
and has made the world a better place.  But we are realistic 
about the role of government and power in that future, and 
realists about the prospects for the future. 
I regret to say that it has been the Chinese government that has done the most 
to prove our basic thesis correct.  The Jello was, somehow, nailed to the wall.  
Despite nearly a decade of Westerners (most particularly Western newspaper 
columnists) assuming or hoping that the Net would bring down the Chinese 
state, it didn’t happen; indeed it never even came close.  And so, five years later 
the basic ideas in our book seem hard to contest.  Consequently, this one 
particular species of Internet exceptionalism—the idea that the network has its 
own sovereignty in a sense, or is an exception to law—has weakened and may 
be dead.   
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In the summer of 2010, in fact, as if to hammer to point home, the Chinese 
government released a new White Paper on “Internet Policy.”  It made its 
centerpiece the phrase coined by the Internet exceptionalists of the 1990s: 
“Internet Sovereignty.”  However, that phrase did not mean what it did in the 
1990s.  Rather as the People’s Daily, the state newspaper, explained, “Internet 
Sovereignty” means that “all foreign IT companies operating in China must 
abide by China’s laws and [be] subject to Beijing’s oversight.”6   
* * * 
Leaving law aside, however, the larger questions of Internet Exceptionalism 
remain unanswered.  It is surely one thing for the Internet to be a living 
exception to the legal system, a sovereign unto itself in some way.  But is the 
Network an exception as an information network, as a means for a nation or world 
to communicate? Here, surely, the exceptionalist is on far stronger ground.  
Whatever you might say about efforts to use the Internet to avoid law, we 
cannot doubt that the “Networks of Networks” has changed the way we 
communicate in dramatic fashion.  Technologically, and in its effects on 
business, culture and politics, the Internet seems, by almost any account, an 
exception, different from the way other systems of mass communications have 
operated, whether the telephone, radio, or the television. 
This point seems so obvious as to be commonplace to anyone who’s lived 
through the 1990s.  Unlike television, radio and newspapers, which all are 
speech outlets for a privileged few, the Internet allows anyone to be a publisher.  
Unlike the private cable networks, the Internet is public and, in its totality, 
owned by no one.  Unlike the telephone system, it carries video, graphics, the 
Web, and supports any idea anyone can come up with.  It has played host to 
generations of new inventions, from email and the World Wide Web to the 
search engine, from shops like eBay and Amazon to social networking and 
blogging.  It has challenged and changed industries, from entertainment to 
banking and travel industries.  These features and others are what have made 
the Network so interesting for so many years. 
The question is whether, however, the Internet is different in a lasting way.  
What do I mean, “a lasting way?” I rely on the sense that certain ideas, once 
spread, seem to lodge permanently, or for centuries at least—e.g., the idea of 
property, civil rights, or vaccination.  Each is an idea that, once received, has a 
way of embedding itself so deeply as to be nearly impossible to dislodge.  In 
contrast are ideas that, while doubtlessly important, tend, in retrospect, to form 
a rather interesting blip in history, a revolution that came and went.  Will we 
                                                     
6 Information Office of  the State Council of  the People’s Republic of  China, The Internet in 
China, 2010, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm; 
White paper explains ‘Internet Sovereignty’, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, June 9, 2010, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/7018630.html.  
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think of the open age of the Internet the way we think of communism, or the 
hula-hoop?7 
If the Internet is exceptional in a lasting way, it must be for its ideology as 
expressed in its technology.  And in this sense its exceptionalism is similar to 
American exceptionalism.  Both the Nation and the Network were founded on 
unusual and distinct ideologies, following a revolution (one actual, another 
technological).  In a typical account, writer Seymour Martin Lipset writes in 
American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword: “The United States is exceptional 
in starting from a revolutionary event … it has defined its raison d’être 
ideologically.”8  Or, as one-time Columbia professor Richard Hofstadter wrote 
in the 20th century, “it has been our fate as a nation to not to have ideologies, 
but to be one.”9  De Tocqueville put American exceptionalism down to 
particular features of the United States—the religiosity of its founding, its 
proximity to yet freedom from Europe, and, as he wrote, “a thousand special 
causes.”10   
Looking at the Internet, its founding and its development, we can find the same 
pattern of a revolution, an ideology, and many “special causes.”  While much of 
it was purely technical, there were deeply revolutionary ideas, even by 
technological standards, at the heart of the Internet, even if sometimes they 
were arrived at in accidental fashion or for pragmatic reasons. 
Of course, fully describing all that makes the Internet different would take 
another Democracy in America, and we have the benefit of many writers who’ve 
tried to do just that, whether in Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon’s Where 
Wizards Stay up Late, the oral accounts of its creators, classic works like J.H. 
Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, or Jonathan Zittrain’s The 
Future of the Internet.11 
                                                     
7 I’ve spent some time thinking about these questions, and I want to suggest that it isn’t really 
possible to answer the question in full without understanding the story of  the networks that 
preceded the Internet.   My fullest answer to the question I’ve posed, then, is in THE 
MASTER SWITCH (Knopf  2010), an effort to try and find the patterns, over time, that 
surround revolutionary technologies.   This time, unlike in WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET, 
when it comes to the broader question of  the Internet as a way of  moving information, I 
tend to side with the exceptionalists, though it is a close call. 
8 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 18 (1996). 
9 JAMES M. JASPER, RESTLESS NATION 38 (2000). 
10 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 519 (Henry Reeve trans., D. Appleton 
and Company 1904) (1831).  
11 KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
INTERNET (1996);J.  H. Saltzer, D. P.  Reed & D. D.  Clark, End-To-End Arguments in System 
Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS (TOCS) 277-288 (1984); JONATHAN 
ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2009). 
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To understand what makes the Internet different, the origins of the Internet 
bear careful examination.  First, the Network’s predecessors (the telephone, 
cable, etc.) were all commercial enterprises first and foremost, invented and 
deployed (in the U.S.) by private firms.  The Internet, in contrast, was founded 
as a research network, explicitly non-commercial and public for the first decade 
of its existence.  Private companies were involved, yes, but it was not a 
commercial operation in the same sense that, say, the cable networks always 
were.   
Perhaps, thanks to its origins, the Internet was founded with an ideology that 
was far more explicit than most—a kind of pragmatic libertarianism whose 
influence remains.  The early Internet scientists had various principles that they 
were proud of.  One example is David Clark’s memorable adage.  “We reject: 
kings, presidents, and voting.  We believe in: rough consensus and running 
code.”  Another is found in a famous Request For Comments written by 
Internet founder Jon Postel, setting forth the following as a principle for 
network operators: “Be conservative in what you do.  Be liberal in what you 
accept from others.”12 
The Network constituted not just a technological advance, though it was that as 
well, but also a rejection of dominant theories of system design and, in a deeper 
sense, a revolution in information governance.  The early Internet researchers 
were designing a radically decentralized network in an age—the mid-1960s—
when highly centralized systems ran nearly every aspect of American and world 
life.  In communications this was represented by AT&T, the great monopolist, 
with its mighty and near-perfect telephone network.  But it could also be found 
in other aspects of society, from the enlarged Defense Department that ran the 
Cold War, the new, giant government agencies that ran social programs, and 
enormous corporations like General Motors, IBM, and General Electric. 
So when Vint Cerf and his colleagues put the Internet on the TCP/IP protocol 
in 1982 (its effective “launch”), most information networks—and I don’t mean 
this is a pejorative sense—could be described as top-down dictatorships.  One 
entity—usually a firm or a part of the State (or both), like AT&T or the BBC, 
decided what the network would be.  The Internet, in contrast, has long been 
governed more like a federation of networks, and in some respects, like a 
Republic of Users.  That is implicit in the ability of anyone to own an IP 
address, set up a website, and publish information—something never true, and 
still not true, on any other network. 
                                                     
12 Paulina Borsook, How Anarchy Works, WIRED (Oct. 1995), 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.10/ietf.html; Jon Postel, Information Sciences 
Institute of  the University of  Southern California, DOD Standard Transmission Control 
Protocol 13 (1980), available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc761#section-2.10.  
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Throughout its history, the universal Network has, true to the governance 
structure, seen a pattern of innovation that is unlike any other.  This too is the 
subject of much scholarship and popular recognition—the mode of 
“decentralized innovation” that had led every several years or so to the next 
wonder, starting with email, through the Web, search engines, online retail, Web 
video, social networking, and onward.  These innovations arrived in a highly 
disorganized fashion often led by amateurs and outsiders.  The spread of 
computer-networking itself began with amateur geeks glorified in 1980s films 
like War Games.13  It is hard to think of a truly important Internet invention that 
came from a firm that predated the Internet.  Society-changers like Craigslist, 
eBay, Wikipedia and blogs are obviously the products of geeks. 
* * * 
Can it last? Can the Internet remain, in this sense, exceptional? Whatever the 
Internet’s original ideas, it is easy to argue that all this, too, shall pass.  The 
argument from transience suggests that all that seems revolutionary about the 
Internet is actually just a phase common to speech inventions.  In other words, 
the Internet is following a path already blazed by other revolutionary inventions 
in their time, from the telephone to radio.  Such disruptive innovations usually 
do arrive as an outsider of some kind, and will pass through what you might call 
a “utopian” or “open” phase—which is where we are now.  But that’s just a 
phase.  As time passes, even yesterday’s radical new invention becomes the 
foundation and sole possession of one or more great firms, monopolists, or 
sometimes, the state, particularly in totalitarian regimes like the Soviet Union or 
the Third Reich.  The openness ends, replaced with better production value and 
tighter controls.  It is, in other words, back to normal, or at least what passed 
for normal for most of human history. 
We might learn from the fate of the broadcast radio, the darling new technology 
of the 1920s.14  In the 1920s, opening a radio station was relatively easy, not 
quite as easy as a website, but within the reach of amateurs.  American radio was 
once radically decentralized, open and rather utopian in its aspirations.  But by 
the 1930s, broadcast in the United States was increasing controlled by the 
chains—most of all, the National Broadcast Company, NBC, who brought 
better programming, but also much less of the amateur, open spirit.  But that’s 
nothing compared to countries like Germany and the Soviet Union, where radio 
became the domain of the state, used to control and cajole.  In Germany, every 
citizen was issued a “people’s receiver” tuned only to Nazi channels, and within 
                                                     
13 War Games (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1983) 
14 This story of  radio can be found in TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH, chaps 3, 5 (2010). 
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the space of a decade, the free radio had became what Joseph Goebbels called 
the “spiritual weapon of the totalitarian state.”15 
Yet I find it hard to imagine such a dramatic or immediate fate for the Internet.  
It seems in so many ways too established, its values too enmeshed in society, to 
disappear in an instant.   
Perhaps it would be more accurate to suggest that there are aspects of the 
Internet ideology that are more and less likely to fade, to become yesterday’s 
ideas.  At one extreme, the Internet’s core technological ideas, protocol layering 
& packet-switching, seem unlikely to go anywhere.  The reason is that these 
techniques have become the basis of almost all information technology, not just 
the Internet itself.  The telephone networks are today layered and packet-
switched, even if they don’t rely on the Internet Protocol. 
More vulnerable, however, are the Internet’s early ideas of openness and 
decentralized operation—putting the intelligence in the edges, as opposed to the 
center of the network.  Originally described by engineers as the E2E principle, 
and popularly contained in the catch-phrase “Net Neutrality,” these principles 
have survived the arrival of broadband networks.  Yet by its nature, Net 
Neutrality seems easier to upset, for discrimination in information systems has 
long been the rule, not the exception.  There are, importantly, certain 
commercial advantages to discriminatory networking that are impossible to 
deny, temptations that even the Internet’s most open firms find difficult to 
resist.  So while I may personally think open networking is important for 
reasons related to innovation and free speech, it seems obvious to me that open 
networking principles can be dislodged from their current perch. 
Another open question is whether some of the means of production and 
cultural creativity that are associated with the Internet are destined for lasting 
importance.  We have recently lived through an era when it was not unusual for 
an amateur video or blog to gain a greater viewership than films made for tens 
of millions.  But is that, Lessig’s “remix culture,”16 a novelty of our times? We 
also live in era where free software is often better than that which you pay for.  
They are the products of open production systems, the subject of Yochai 
Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks, the engines behind Linux and Wikipedia and 
other mass projects—as discussed in Benkler’s essay in this collection.17  Of 
course such systems have always existed, but will they retreat to secondary 
                                                     
15 Quoted in Garth S. Jowett, GARTH JOWETT & VICTORIA O’DONNELL, READINGS IN 
PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION 132 (2005). 
16 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY (2008). 
17 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2007). 
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roles? Or will they perhaps become of primary importance for many areas of 
national life? 
The only honest answer is that it is too early to tell.  And yet, at the same time, 
the transience of all systems suggests that at least some of what we take for 
granted right now as intrinsic to our information life and to the nature of the 
Internet will fade.   
The reasons are many.  It might simply be that the underlying ideas just 
discussed turn out to have their limits.  Or that they are subject to an almost 
natural cycle—excessive decentralization begins to make centralization more 
attractive, and vice versa.  More sinisterly, it might be because forces 
disadvantaged by these ideas seem to undermine their power—whether 
concentrated forces, like a powerful state, or more subtle forces, like the human 
desire for security, simplicity and ease that has long powered firms from the 
National Broadcasting Corporation to Apple, Inc.  
Whatever the reasons, and while I do think the Internet is exceptional (like the 
United States itself), I also think it will, come to resemble more “normal” 
information networks—indeed, it has already begun to do so in many ways.  
Exceptionalism, in short, cannot be assumed, but must be defended. 
* * * 
I began this essay with a comparison between Internet and American 
exceptionalism.  Yet I want to close by suggesting we can learn from the 
comparison in a slightly different sense.  I’ve suggested that there is a natural 
tendency for any exceptional system to fade and transition back to observed 
patterns.  But even if that’s true, what is natural is not always normatively good, 
not always what we want.  For example, it may very well be “natural” for a 
democracy, after a few decades or less, to ripen into a dictatorship of some 
kind, given the frustrations and inefficiencies of democratic governance.  
Cromwell and Napoleon are the bearers of that particular tradition, and it has 
certainly been the pattern over much of history. 
But the idea of American Exceptionalism has included a commitment to trying 
to avoid that fate, even if it may be natural.  Despite a few close calls, the 
United States remains an exception to the old rule that Republics inevitably 
collapse back into dictatorship under the sway of a great leader.  The Internet, 
so far, is an exception to the rule that open networks inevitably close and 
become dominated by the State or a small number of mighty monopolists.  
Twenty-five years after .COM, we might say we still have a republic of 
information—if we can keep it. 
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